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1. INTRODUCTION
Althoughexecutive stock options—the right granted to management and/cr employees to
buy a company's stock at a pre-specified price during a specified length af time—have
become a well-established part of management compensation in the ISA (Hall and
Liebman .998; Murphy 1999), their use has permeated Continental Europe only recently.
Listed conpanies in the Netherlands started to use this form of compensatbn extensively
as of the nid- 1990s. The idea underlying the use of stock options is that the/ can turn paid
managers into owners, thus aligning their interests with those of shareholders. As a result,
company nanagers will be more motivated 10 strive towards firms' financial-raarkets-related
performance. Moreover, these stock-based compensation plans may not only strengthen
the link between compensation and performance for existing recipients, but can also assist
a firm in binging talented new staff onboard. This appears especially relevant in high-tech
sector finis.
Stock-based compensation has fuelled ai avalanche of criticism from diferent sources.
The Prime Minister of the Netherlands qualifies some option schemes as 'exhibitionistic
enrichment'. The main Dutch trade union federation argues that, because o
rstock option
awards, a typical Dutch manager now earns many times the wage of an average factory
worker. THs raises questions of justice and inequality of incomes and may, h turn, under-
mine harmonious labour relations within tie country (Het Financieele Dagblid, 31 August
1999). Duffhues (2000) stresses the agency aspects of stock option plans refeiring to incen-
tives to earnings management and/or distorted financial decision making-tie proposes to
introduce anew type of compensation optioi namely 'Delayed Average Rate Executive Call
Options' (DARECOs). The pay-off of this option is based on the average realized market
price during the employment contract of the option holder.
The controversy with stock options is dso present in other European countries like
Belgium, France, Germany, and Spain. The Wall Street Journal Europe in its '. 2 December
1999 issue reviews the situation in Europe and notes the following: 'stock options and the
wealth that accompanies success in the nev economy are widely regarded in Europe as
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inmoral, unjust or just plain excessive'. The Economist (7 August 1999) also observes that
the spread of stock options may be distorting the economy, contributing to a temporary
overvaluation of equities, encouraging shortsighted managerial decisions, and storing up
problems for companies in the future.
In the wake of this heated dis:ussion, we sketch the main characteristics of employee
stock option plans adopted by Dutch listed companies. A campaign for better governance
;nd transparent disclosure regarding executive compensation has started in the Netherlands
in 1997 following recommendatons of the Peters Committee.
1 One of these recommen-
dations was that stock options issued to board members and other employees should be
reported in annual reports togener with the most important conditions. Since no legal
icquirement exists, Dutch companies voluntarily disclose information on aggregate com-
pensation. Other important details such as the level and the composition of each executive's
compensation, stock option grantdate, stock option terms, and maragerial share ownership
are usually not reported. Almost three-quarters of Dutch quoted firms award stock options
is part of employee compensatior schemes. In more than 70 per cent of cases, stock options
are exclusively granted to directois and senior managers. The popu arity of stock options as
a form of executive compensation has increased considerably as can be observed from the
fact that half of all outstanding management stock options was graited in 1997.
The results of this chapter suggest that granting stock options depends on corporate
operating performance. While controlling for firm-specific characteristics such as firm-size,
leverage and industry, and corporate governance characteristics such as ownership struc-
ture and anti-takeover devices, we also find that stock option grants influence future firm
performance.
The outline of the remaining part of the chapter is as follows. Section 2 explores the con-
trasting merits, expounds the pros and cons of stock options and concisely reviews prior
research. Section 3 describes the sample and Section 4 presents the features of employee
stock option plans in the Netherlands. The relationship between corporate performance
and employee stock option grants is investigated in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 summarizes
the main findings.
2. THE PROS AND CONS OF EXECUTIVE STOCK OPTIONS
The first argument in favour of executive stock option schemes is that agency conflict
between managers and shareholders are reduced. With an increased alignment of interests,
managers have incentives to take those actions that increase shareholder wealth. Empirical
evidence on the use of stock option schemes come primarily fron the USA. Heath et al
(1999) find that the mean expected value of stock options constitites 160 per cent of base
yearly salary in the US (the median is 35 per cent). Conyon and Murphy (1999) compare
the composition of chief executive officers' pay in the US with that of the UK. They find
that stock option grants constitute one-third of total pay of US CEOs compared to only 10
per cent for UK CEOs. In addition, the median stock option compensation for US CEOs is
more than ten times that of UK CEOs. Hall and Liebman (199S) find that, for a given
change in firm value, the incentive effects of salary and bonus changes are fifty-three times
smaller than those from stock options. With long-term compensation schemes, managers670 P.Du/huesetzL
have, therefore, increased incentives to spend more effort to achieve higher earnings and/or
market value.
A second argument is that executive stork options reduce the risk-averse behaviour of
managers (Murphy 1999). When managers -eceive compensation in the formof fixed salary
only, they do not have additional incentives in searching for new and valte maximizing
investments. This feature, along with their liability to diversify firm-specific human capital
and their concern for job security, reinforces a tendency for managers towards avoiding
risky inves:ment projects. Empirical support of the risk-averse hypothesis in the US is found
by DeFusco etal. (1990). For firms announcing the adoption of executive stock options
plans, they find an increase in the variability of stock returns.
Thirdly, stock option plans can also bring about considerable tax advantages for employees
and firms (Beatty 1995; Conyon and Murphy 1999). The tax impact of stock options in the
Netherlancs is analysed by Veld (1999). F:>r personal income tax purposes, the value of
employee stock options is determined by Du:ch tax authorities as a percentageof the price of
the underlying stock and is taxed as ordinary income at the moment these options are received
by an empbyee. This rule can lead to a favourable tax treatment of employee stock options in
a boomingmarket.
2 Moreover, if an employee can demonstrate that the fiscal value of stock
options is above the fair value (which is hardy the case), then the option is taxed according
to the fair value.
Finally, stock option schemes are considered to be an attractive employmeni condition for
both existing and new employees. Granting stock options has become a necessity in com-
petitive and international labour markets, where retaining and attracting highly qualified
personnel is an outright challenge. In this way, employee options schemes nduce a firm's
asset risk, vrhich results in a lower systematic risk of the stock (Duffhues 2000).
There exist several arguments against the tse of employee stock options. Some authors do
not find a strong link between executive stoct options and performance (Jensen and Murphy
1990). Likewise, Conyon etal. (1995) report a very small pay-performance sensitivity in the
UK. Stock options may make managers non-neutral with respect to risk-takirg. Given that
stock optiois become more valuable as the volatility of stock returns increajes, managers
may be inclined to raise company risk in an inadvertent way. Yermack (1997) confirms this
potentially opportunistic behaviour by USA managers who receive stock options prior to the
release of good news. Furthermore, executive stock options may allow managers to convert
private information into hard cash through irsider trading transactions.
Another important criticism of executive stock options is that these are poorly under-
stood. Executive stock options are not transferable and the exercise decisioi is made by
executives vho can influence the stock price itself. Stock option plans easily jet the nod of
non-executive board members, without a d*ep understanding of the comp ex- nature of
stock options and the incentives they create (Hall and Liebman 1998). Additionally, the
costs of stock options for the shareholders and the firm are not adequately reported in com-
pany's financial statements (Matsunaga 1995; Duffhues etal. 1999). Murray etal. (1998)
find that USA companies granting management options overstated their profits by as much
as 50 per ceit in the financial year ending 1S98. Stock options are often stumbling stones
in mergers between US and foreign companies (TheEconomist, 8 May 1999).
3 Finally, stock
options create puzzles for risk managers because of the short position in the stock after
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granting options. These positions create emphatic questions about the need for hedging
iDuffhues 2000).
3. SAMPLE DESCRIPTION
Our investigation is based on all 168 industrial firms listed on the Amsterdam Exchanges
at the end of 1998. Companies in the Netherlands are encouraged to voluntarily disclose
information on top management compensation—including salary, bonus, and stock options—
in the annual reports. No other strict requirements exist for full and timely disclosure,
information on the award of stock option plans is disclosed by 119 companies (71 per cent
of all listed Dutch companies) in the annual reports. Six recent IFOs were excluded from
the sample.
As there is no standardized reporting practice, Dutch companies disclose compensation-
iclated information in annual reports in a variety of ways. It is common for companies to
teport the aggregate compensation of all board members. Thus, it is not possible to know
managerial compensation on indi/idual basis. Some companies report only the total num-
ber of outstanding employee stock options while some others report only the total number
of options granted during the particular year. Many companies report information on stock
options granted to all employees as a whole without providing separate figures on those
granted to board members. Only i few Dutch companies report separately detailed infor-
nation on stock options, salary and bonus for individual managers. It is also difficult to
assess the reason of granting employee stock options. The most cited reason for using stock
cption schemes is the desire to strengthen the involvement of managers and employees in
tie firm (mentioned by 18 per cert of firms).
For all firms listed in 1998, which report employee stock options grants in the 1997
annual reports, we hand-collect all disclosed information: option-specific data such as price
and number of options granted to management and other employees, price and number of
options exercised, and the total number of stock options outstanding. Total assets, total
siles, market capitalization, and/or its number of employees, firm-age, operating income,
after-tax net income and industry type are collected from annual reports, and from the
database REACH.
Prior studies show that compensation practices differ across industries (DeFusco et al.
1990; Conyon and Murphy 1999;Murphy 1999). Thirteen per cent of our sample belongs
to the construction industry, 10 per cent to metals and machinery, aid 9 per cent to each of
these three industries: electronics, fiiancials, and wholesale trade. Computer and technology-
oriented firms constitute 6 per cen: of the sample.
The descriptive statistics of sample firms as of 1997 are shown in Table 28.1: Panel A
reports firm characteristics and Panel B presents performance measures. The company with
the largest market value of common equity that has adopted a stock option plan is valued at
Earo 108 billion (Royal Dutch), while the smallest firm has a market value equal to Euro
39 million (Porceleyne Fles). The median debt-to-equity ratio (D/£) is almost 2, but varies
widely. For instance, the D/E ratio of the financial firm van der HoopEffektenbank is almost
33, whereas that of Philips Electronics amounts to a mere 1.7. Philips Electronics has the
largest number of employees (268,000 employees) followed by Ahold (121,000 employees),672
1. Summary statistics of ample firms awarding employee stock optons
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The table shows summary statistics for the following variables: total assets (TA), total sales (T5), market value of
equity (MVE), debt/equity ratio (D/£), average number of people employed (EMPL), number of years elapsed
since the start of listing (Listing), earnings per sha-e (EPS), operating earnings per share (OPS), return on
total assets (F.OA), return on common equity (ROE), price-earnings ratio (PE), market-to-boofc ratio of common
equity (M/B.
4. THE AWARD OF EMPLOYEE STOCK OPTIONS
All but two sample companies disclosed data on the total number of options outstanding at
fiscal year-end 1997. The first column of Table 28.2 (TOTOPT) shows that the average
firm has 1.50 million employee stock optiors outstanding and that the number of options
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whereas Porceleyne Fles has only 4,000 stock options. The median number of total
outstanding stock options amounts to 292,COO. The second column of Table 28.2 provides
information on the total number of management options outstanding (MNGOPT). Only
fifty-nine firms (52 per cent) disclose this information. In light of the opaque disclosure
on management options, we cannot ascertain whether these options belong to executive/
non-executive board members and/or senior managers.
5 Management options are most
widespreac at Philips Electronics, with the maximum number of management options
outstanding equal to 7.1 million, whereas Porceleyne Fles has only 4,000 options. It is
interesting to note that in two firms, managers are kept out of stock option plans as these are
targeted at other employees on an exclusive tasis. Seventy-nine companies (7C per cent) dis-
close infornation on stock options awarded to senior managers during the fiscal year 1997
(MGRNT97). The average number of options granted during the year 1997 equals
349,255 while the median number amounts to 72,500. Many multinational enterprises
such as Royal Dutch, Philips, Ahold, PolyGram, KNP-BT, and KLM are leading the way in
granting mmagement options.
The fracion of total outstanding management options relative to the total outstanding
stock optiois (MNGT/TOT) is presented in the fifth column of Table 28.2: tie lion's share
of stock op:ions (73 per cent) is granted to board members and senior managers. The next
two columrs of Table 28.2 show the fractior of management options granted in 1997 rela-
tive to the total number of outstanding management options (GRNT/MNGT) and relative to
the total nunber of outstanding stock optiors (GRNT/TOT), respectively. Fifty per cent of
total management options is granted in 1997, The number of stock options graited to senior
managers in 1997 is equal to 38 per cent of the total number of outstanding stock options.
The fraction of total stock options relative to the total number of outstanding common
stocks (OPI/NOS) averages 3 per cent, whilethe median is 1.5 per cent. In con:rast, Aboody
(1996) repcrts that the mean fraction of outstanding stock options relative to outstanding
shares is 9.4 per cent in the US (median is 7.5 per cent). This low ratio for oursample firms
indicates that Dutch firms are exposed to nei:her a huge risk of earnings-per-share dilution
nor voting power dilution. But, the risk of dilation can be substantial for specific companies.
For instance the sample contains one firm which has granted stock options to ts employees
amounting to 23 per cent of total common shires outstanding.
Information on the exercise price of stock options is also collected from annual reports.
Several firms disclose detailed information containing the exercise price of stock options
with differing maturities. In the final three columns of Table 28.2, the fraction of the aver-
age exercise price relative to the share price (5X/SHRP) is disclosed. As companies do not
usually report the prevailing market price of stocks at the time of granting stock options or
announce the exact grant date, the end-of-fiscal year share price is used, as a benchmark.
The average exercise price of employee stock options is about 88 per cent of the end-of-year
share price. Murphy (1999) reports that the exercise price equals the grant-date fair market
value in 95 per cent of the regular option grants in the USA. The mean fraction of total exer-
cise value reative to the book value of firm s equity (EX/BVE) equals 12 percent (with a
median of 4 per cent). Finally, the average fraction of total exercise value relative to the mar-
ket value of common equity (EX/MVE) is 2.5 per cent.
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5. EMPLOYEE STOCK OPTIONS AND FIRM PERFORMANCE
W? now test the relationship between stock option grants and firm performance. The standard
testing procedure followed in the conpensation literature uses manager's compensation as the
dependent variable and firm performance as the independent variaUe (Murphy 1999). As
stock options are a form of incentivs-based compensation, a non-contemporaneous form of
relationship is estimated. Previous studies (Conyon and Murphy 1999; Murphy 1999) indi-
cate that monitoring mechanisms used by shareholders usually depend on size, leverage, and
industry. As other governance mechmisms may influence executive compensation, we control
for these governance characteristics. For example, when ownership concentration of firms is
high, shareholders have higher incentives to monitor managers more closely, which reduces
the need to use incentive-based compensation. We also control for the presence of anti-
takeover devices. Almost all Dutch firms have multiple takeover defence measures that reduce
the disciplinary effect of the market for corporate control (Kabir etal 1997). In the absence
of takeover threats, shareholders tray try to restore managerial discipline with increased
incentive-based compensation. Managers of protected firms may also have a decisive say in
setting their own compensation.
Regressions (1) and (2) of Table 18.3 are univariate, relating previous year's performance
with current year's stock option graits. These results indicate that previous period's operat-
ing performance has a positive influence on stock option grants. The multivariate analysis
(regressions (3) and (4)) include firm-specific and corporate governance characteristics.
Including four control variables does not affect the positive relationship between firm per-
formance and stock option grants. The ROA coefficient increases si ghtly, but the corres-
ponding r-value declines somewhat ROE is also positive and statisttally significant. Firm
size, as measured by the natural logarithm of total assets, is negatively related with stock
oprion grants. Leverage, as measured by the debt-equity ratio, is significantly positive in
regression (3), but insignificant in -egression (4). Ownership concentration, as measured
by the Herfindahl value of all blockioldings, is insignificant in both regressions. Similarly,
the coefficient of the anti-takeover device, which is a dummy variable that equals 1 if a firm
haj issued non-voting shares and 0 otherwise, has no significant irrpact on stock option
gnnts.
6 Since firm size and ownership concentration are correlated, aseparate regression is
estimated omitting firm size, but the results do not materially change The results obtained
from this study are qualitatively similar to those reported by de Jong er al. (2000). Likewise,
they do not find a significant relationship between firm value as measured by Tobin's Qjmd
diferent corporate governance characteristics like ownership structure and anti-takeover
measures.
3y granting stock options to managers and employees, subsequent performance of firms
is expected to improve. Therefore, ve estimate a model using ROA and ROE for the year
19?8 as the dependent variable anc stock option grants in 1997 as the explanatory vari-
abb. The regression results are presented in Panel B of Table 28.3. The univariate results of
regressions (5) and (6) show that stcck options granted in 1997 have a significant positive
impact on the ROA and ROE in 1998. Of the four control variables, none is statistically sig-
nificant in regression (7), and only leverage is significant in regressicn (8). The regression676 P.Duffluesttzl
Table 28.3. Regression results for stock option grants and firm performance
Panel A: Regresson of stock option grants on prior firm perfornance
This table sh«ws the results for the regression model \diere the dependent variable is the fraction of management
options granted in 1997 relative to total outstandiig options (panel A). The explanatory variables are the
following: fiim performance in 1996 measured by ROA and ROE; firm-size is the natural logarithm of book value
of total asses; leverage is measured by the debt-ecuity ratio; ownership concentration is neasured by the
Herfindahl irdex of all blockholdings; anti-take-over device is measured by a dummy variable vith a value of 1 if
the firm has preferred defense share mechanism, 0 otherwise. Panel B shows the results for the regression model
where firm ptrformance of 1998 (measured by ROA aid ROE) is used as the dependent variable The explanatory
variables incbde stock option grants defined as the friction of management options granted ir 1997 relative to
total outstanding options. The /-statistic is reported within parentheses. ***, **, and * represent statistical
significance it 1, 5, and 10 per cent level, respectively.
analysis is also performed with industry dunmies, none of which is statistically significant.
Overall, tke results presented here indicate that employee stock option grants are closely
related to firm's accounting performance. Well performing companies issue stock options
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6. CONCLUSION
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Sto:k options are increasingly used as part of management and empbyee remuneration in
the Netherlands. There exists no legal regulation mandating publicly traded companies to
disdose information on executive compensation and employee stock options, though there
are'recommendations' of accounting organizations. Seventy-one per cent of Dutch listed
conpanies disclose information abcut management and employee s:ock option schemes.
Stock options are largely the prerogative of managers. On balance, 73 per cent of total
employee stock options are held by executive board members and top managers. Half of all
outstanding management stock optbns are granted in 1997 alone. We find a positive rela-
tionship between stock option grants and firm's operating performance. Firms with high
returns grant relatively more emplo/ee stock options. Furthermore, stock option schemes
lead to higher operating performance in the subsequent year.
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Notes
1. The Committee on Corporate Governance, popularly known as the Peters Committee (named
after its chairman), addressed corpo-ate governance issues in the Netherlands. It has formulated
forty recommendations on the disdosure of governance-related information and the working
of management and supervisory boards. The Peters Committee is equivalent to the Cadbury
Committee in the UK.
2. In the US, stock options generally dc not result in taxable income until the year of exercise or later.
In addition, this income is often taxed at a reduced capital gains rate.
3. Investors and executives of non-US firms appear to have difficulties in accepting the generous
stock option compensation practice prevailing in US firms.
4. A meaningful analysis would invohe comparing performance with that of a matched sample of
firms without stock options. But, the small number of Dutch listed firms without stock options
does not allow such analysis.
5. Many firms report options awardec to top ranking officials without making specific reference
to management board. It is also no: possible to determine whether managers of the remaining
sample firms receive stock options or not. Hence, these and following descriptive statistics should
be interpreted with some caution.
6. Additional analysis is performed incbding industry dummies in these regressions. The coefficients
of industry dummies are mostly positive but not statistically significant Also, other proxies for
ownership concentration and anti-takeover devices are used as explanatory variables. There are no
qualitative changes in the obtained findings. These regression results are, :herefore, not presented.
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